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JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Department of the Army  
Washington 25, D. C.  
7 December 1950

JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

No. 18

1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. Military and political indications point to Communist intentions to insist upon a solution of Far East problems strictly along lines which further Communist world objectives. The Soviets are fully aware that Chinese Communist actions have increased and continue to increase the possibility of war. There are no indications that the Soviets and their Communist allies in pursuing their major objectives intend to avoid future actions which might precipitate global hostilities.
- b. The Chinese Communist offensive in Korea is designed not only to drive the U.N. forces out of Korea but also to weaken the U.S. military position in the Far East by the infliction of maximum losses upon U.S. troops. There is a probability that Communist air forces may be extensively employed in Korea in the near future.
- c. Indications suggest that the Chinese Communists intend to intervene in Indo-China and such intervention may occur within the next few weeks.
- d. Increasing Communist pressure on Japan is reported but there are no firm indications to confirm recent rumors of a Soviet air attack on Japan.
- e. Evidence of intensified propaganda and political pressure on Berlin and West Germany and other preparations, may indicate a Soviet intent to precipitate some crisis in Europe in the relatively near future. There are, however, no firm indications of an imminent Soviet or Satellite move in Europe.

2. SUMMARY OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. KOREA-CHINA.--Enemy forces engaged in Korea continued to be preponderantly Chinese Communist and it is apparent that the Chinese Communists are prepared to commit overwhelming numbers of troops. Several unconfirmed reports indicate that the Communists may employ air power on a considerably increased scale in Korea in the near future, possibly

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in connection with attempted evacuations of U.S. troops. Chinese Communist propaganda and actions leave no doubt that their course of action has been fully coordinated with the U.S.S.R. and that they intend to further weaken the U.S. through the destruction of U.S. military forces in the Far East.

- b. JAPAN.--There have been recent rumors of a Soviet air attack on Japan concurrent with Chinese Communist operations in Korea, but there is no firm supporting evidence. If the Soviet planes sent to Manchuria are attack types, as reported, they are of insufficient range to attack Japan. Soviet propaganda charging the U.S. with using Japanese troops in Korea and arming the Japanese is increasing.
- c. INDO-CHINA.--There are indefinite reports of Chinese Communist military preparations to intervene in Indo-China and reliable reports of their efforts to secure anti-malarial drugs. The reaction to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea has increased the possibility of similar action in Indo-China and such action may occur within the next few weeks.
- d. TIBET.--Chinese Communist preparations for an attack are continuing but there is no information to indicate a further advance.
- e. GERMANY.--Communist political pressure on West Germany and Berlin has been renewed, with East German Government officials demanding immediate discussions with West German authorities and a call for free democratic elections in Berlin. The Soviets have announced their support of these measures which may indicate an intention of proceeding with measures in furtherance of Communist plans for the unification of Berlin and all Germany.
- f. EUROPE.--There are reports of accelerated airfield construction in East Germany and Poland despite winter weather and the military are reported to have assumed control of civil airfields in Western Czechoslovakia. The Eastern European Satellites are making heavy purchases of medical equipment and drugs. There are few indications of unusual troop activity in Eastern Europe, except for a reported considerable increase in Czech troops along the Czech-U.S. Zone border. Some recent unusual occurrences in Western Europe include the jamming of operational radio traffic in the Mediterranean and Iceland areas. Western European Communist Parties have been intensifying their preparations for partisan and sabotage action for several months but there are no firm indications, other than the recent sabotage in Norway, that increased action may be planned in the near future.
- g. GENERAL.--There are numerous indications that the U.S.S.R. and its Satellites consider their position to be one of strength in comparison with the West, and there has been heavy propaganda emphasis that the West is weak and divided and that the U.S. would not dare to start and cannot hope to win a world war. Also, there has been continued emphasis on the line that the U.S. intends to precipitate a new world war.

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TAB "A"

REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS  
Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee  
6 December 1950

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. The nature of the Chinese Communist offensive in Korea, the continuing evidence of reinforcement of Chinese Communist forces in Korea and of a further build-up of their forces in Manchuria, and other developments support the conclusion that the immediate objective of the Chinese Communists is not only to drive the U.S. forces out of Korea but also to annihilate as many U.S. troops as possible. There are some indications that, in pursuing this objective, the Communists intend to commit considerably more air power than they have hitherto.

(1) The enemy forces engaged in the offensive in Korea continued to be almost entirely Chinese Communist units. Seven Chinese Communist armies plus elements of three other armies, totalling over 250,000 troops, are reportedly engaged in Korea. In addition there are indications that additional armies have been deployed from China proper to the Manchurian-Korean theater of operations. Seven armies, elements of ten other armies, and special units totalling approximately 275,000 combat troops are now estimated to be in Manchuria. It is apparent that the Chinese Communists have available an overwhelming preponderance of ground strength and that they intend to commit as much as they consider necessary in an attempt to inflict the maximum losses on the U.N. forces and to drive them from Korea.

(2) Several unconfirmed reports have indicated that the Communists in the near future might employ considerably more air power in Korea, possibly against attempted evacuations of U.S. troops. There are reports that a hundred or more Soviet Il-10 aircraft (attack bombers) arrived in Manchuria from the U.S.S.R. during the last week of November and rumors that a strong Communist air commitment is intended soon. There is a possibility that such action would involve the covert participation of Soviet as well as Chinese Communist air personnel. A recent report of the aid reportedly promised the Chinese Communists by the U.S.S.R. states that 100 heavy 4-engine bombers as well as fighter and transport aircraft are included.

(3) Chinese Communist actions as well as propaganda now leave no doubt that their plans have been fully coordinated with the U.S.S.R. and that the Chinese Communists' intention is to weaken the U.S. through destruction of

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U.S. military forces in the Far East in accordance with a Soviet plan for world domination. In a speech of 4 November, which has only recently become available, a Chinese Communist general stated that the U.S. has insufficient manpower to fight in several areas at once and must therefore conquer Asia before undertaking the decisive war in Europe. Because of the American inferiority in numbers, the U.S., he said, is already suffering heavy losses in Eastern Asia, the least important of all battlefields, and the U.S. position for engaging in a world war is poor. He added that the Chinese Communist anti-American and aid-Korea efforts are designed to check American aggression and to prevent an outbreak of world war, as well as to defend China.

b. The intensification of Soviet propaganda charging the U.S. with using Japanese troops in Korea and rearming the Japanese, together with the assumption of risk of full-scale war in the Far East, raises the possibility that the groundwork is being laid for an attack on Japan. There have been vague reports of the organization of Japanese units by the U.S.S.R., and recent reports of the movement of Soviet aircraft into Manchuria have included rumors that they might be utilized for air attacks on Japan and Formosa simultaneous with the Chinese Communist ground action in Korea. The type of planes reported arriving in Manchuria, however, are of insufficient range for an attack on Japan from bases presently available to the Communists. Such an attack would more probably be launched from the Soviet Maritime Territory. Despite the advantage to the U.S.S.R. of attacking Japan simultaneously with a defeat of U.S. forces in Korea, there are no firm indications of an imminent attack and it appears unlikely that the U.S.S.R. would undertake such action without the expectation of the immediate outbreak of global war.

c. In Indo-China, recent Viet Minh activity has continued to show no firm indications of an intent to launch a major attack against the French perimeter in Tonkin in the near future. The Viet Minh are presently capable of severing communications between Hanoi and Haiphong, mounting an attack on Hanoi, conducting large-scale guerrilla operations and launching other limited operations to cut off French garrisons in the northeast coastal sector. Reports of Chinese Communist preparations to intervene more openly in behalf of the Viet Minh remain nebulous but there have been reports of the recruiting of Chinese "volunteers" to assist the Viet Minh and of the purchase by the Chinese Communists of 30,000 Viet Minh uniforms. Unconfirmed reports state that 38 Soviet-made light tanks have arrived in the Nanning area and that a Chinese Communist regiment with 105-mm howitzers has arrived in the China-Tonkin border area. Reliable reports of Chinese Communist efforts to procure anti-malarial drugs in quantity are another indication of probable intentions to use their forces in Southeast Asia including Indo-China. [redacted] the airfield improvements and evacuations of dependents in South China may indicate offensive as well as defensive preparations, [redacted]

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[REDACTED] The Chinese Communist intervention in Korea has clearly increased the possibility of similar action in Indo-China. As the present balance of power between the French and Viet Minh in Tonkin is precarious, even limited participation by Chinese Communist "volunteers" could upset this balance, and it is entirely possible that the Chinese Communists and Viet Minh may intend a combined operation within the next four to eight weeks, either to drive the French out of Tonkin or to compress them into a beachhead around Haiphong.

d. There is no new information to indicate that the Chinese Communist invasion of Tibet is actually proceeding but there are reports of the continuing operation of the Chinese Communist air lift to the troops in Sikang Province and of the construction of a road from Sikang to Tibet.

e. There is no new information with regard to Chinese Communist pressure on Burma, Thailand or other areas of Southeast Asia.

f. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) The Chinese Communist offensive in Korea is designed not only to drive the U.N. forces out of Korea but to weaken the U.S. military position in the Far East through the destruction of as many U.S. troops as possible. There is a probability that Communist air forces may be extensively employed in Korea in the near future. All indications are that the Chinese Communist actions have been fully coordinated with Soviet plans.
- (2) There is an increased possibility that the Chinese Communists intend also to intervene in Indo-China and such intervention may occur within the next few weeks.
- (3) There are indications of increasing Soviet pressure on Japan, and there are rumors of Soviet air attacks on Japan in the near future. There are no firm indications of such an attack, however, which the U.S.S.R. would probably undertake only in the expectation of immediate global war.

## 2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. Communist pressure on West Germany and particularly on Berlin was renewed during the Berlin election. On 23 November the East German Communist leaders issued a call for free democratic elections throughout all Berlin in March 1951, and in subsequent speeches East German political leaders announced their intentions to bring about talks between East and West Germany. A letter from the Soviet Control Commission, which was printed in the Moscow press, stated that the Soviet Control Commission was "prepared on its part to adopt measures which will assist in the reestablishment of unity of the city on a democratic basis."

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On 30 November, the East German Government issued a communique stating that the Cabinet has discussed in detail "the sharpened national emergency created by the remilitarization of West Germany and the incorporation of West Germany in imperialist war preparations." On 1 December the East German Premier officially and directly appealed to the West German Chancellor for immediate implementation of the Prague unification plan. Since 30 November, leading East German Communists have apparently been absent from Berlin. Western forces in Berlin have recently and for the first time been referred to as "interventionist" troops. This greatly intensified pressure on Berlin and West Germany may indicate an intention of renewed Communist efforts to drive the Western Powers from Berlin and perhaps also to proceed immediately with measures in furtherance of Communist plans for the unification of all Germany. It is noteworthy that similar demands for all-Korea elections preceded the North Korean offensive.

b. There are definite indications that airfield preparations in Eastern Europe are being accelerated despite winter weather. New construction on about six East German airfields has started and construction on several airfields in Poland is progressing rapidly. Civil airfields in Western Czechoslovakia are reliably reported to have been placed under military control.

c. There are reports of recent heavy purchases of medical equipment and drugs by the Eastern European Satellites. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary have ordered and procured considerable blood transfusion equipment, penicillin production equipment and other medical items from the West. A blood transfusion plant secured by Czechoslovakia from Great Britain has a capacity twice that of all such plants in the U.K. and about 8 times that of Czechoslovakia's estimated peacetime requirements. Czechoslovakia has also secured a penicillin production plant, and other Eastern European Satellites are securing or attempting to secure blood transfusion production equipment. A Soviet firm in Austria has reportedly been assigned the task of securing drugs and pharmaceuticals from the West in quantities sufficient to cover the needs of all Eastern countries. It is showing particular interest in securing insulin and streptomycin.

d. There is no information to indicate any particularly unusual military activity by Soviet or Satellite ground forces in Eastern Europe, except a considerable increase of Czech troops reported along the Czech-U.S. Zonal border. Soviet military activity continues to appear normal and there are some indications that the present phase rotation of troops in Germany may have ceased. Recent limited observations in the Bucharest area of Rumania revealed no abnormal activity. AA protection of the Ploesti oil refineries was confirmed, but other AA was concentrated in a gun park. Further evidence of Satellite efforts to secure manpower for military and heavy industry purposes is seen in a Bulgarian announcement that henceforth only women will be appointed to administrative posts in the Ministry of Transport. There have been numerous recent reports of increasing emphasis on heavy production at the cost of consumer goods in Eastern Europe.

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c. There have been indications since last spring that the Communist Parties of Western Europe are strengthening their cadres and partisan groups for ultimate action, but there are no firm indications, that action may be planned in the near future. However, an Italian Communist leader stated in September that the Cominform intended to incite disorders and armed action in several countries and that a situation might soon develop in Germany. The Communist labor federation in France has been unusually quiet recently, possibly in an effort to broaden the base of its support in the labor field but possibly also as a deceptive move.

d. Apart from the increasing Communist pressure on Germany, there would appear to be no firm indications of any imminent Soviet-inspired political or military move in Europe. Several recent unusual occurrences, however, are possibly noteworthy. Within the past few days there were several instances of jamming of radio traffic in the Western European area. The U.S. aircraft carrier, Coral Sea, now in the Western Mediterranean, reported serious disruption of its radio by either deliberate or accidental jamming. At about the same time Malta weather broadcasts for the Central and Eastern Mediterranean encountered jamming, and on 1 December a jamming of operational air traffic was reported from Iceland. Other unusual recent events in Europe have been the previously reported outbreak of sabotage in Norway and the sudden trips of members of the Soviet Repatriation Missions in Austria and Germany, to their respective headquarters in Vienna and Berlin, possibly to secure special instructions. There are no known international Communist conferences scheduled after 7 December, a circumstance which may or may not be significant.

### 3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

a. There are numerous indications that the U.S.S.R. and its Satellites consider their position to be one of tremendous strength, both militarily and psychologically, in comparison with the West. There has been heavy propaganda emphasis that the West is weak and divided and that the U.S. because of weakness cannot hope to win a world war. The Soviet press during the past week placed heavy emphasis on quotes from the U.S. press with regard to American alarm and confusion over Korea and on the possibility that appeasement in the Far East may be a military necessity. The tone of this propaganda would appear to indicate that the U.S.S.R. considers its position so strong that the West will not dare to wage a war against her, and also that the Communists are fully aware of and intend to capitalize on the present divided opinions among the Western powers.

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b. At the same time, however, there was continued emphasis in Soviet propaganda on the line that the U.S. is still bent on precipitating a new world war. A special Pravda article this week, with a style which indicated its having been written by Stalin, stated that no one "but a madman" could now believe in the peaceful intentions of President Truman, that he "needs war and not peace" and has therefore started a new war hysteria. A subsequent Pravda article stated that the Soviet defeat of the German armies at the gates of Moscow in 1941 is a lesson which General MacArthur apparently has not mastered and that this victory, which had an immense effect on the course of World War II, "could have taught much to all claimants to world domination."

c. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) Although there are no firm indications of an imminent major political or military move in Europe, there is evidence of intensified Communist pressure on West Germany, of an acceleration of airfield and medical preparations, and a few unusual occurrences which may indicate a Soviet intent to precipitate some crisis in Europe concurrent with developments in the Far East.
- (2) Recent Soviet and Communist propaganda has placed heavy emphasis both on the weakness of the West and on the fact that the U.S. may nevertheless intend to start a war. This propaganda may be in preparation for further aggressive moves.

*Henry C. Phalt*  
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